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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
 
1.1   Research Questions  
 
This thesis discusses the definition of relevant market in both European Union 
(hereinafter referred as EU) and the People’s Republic of China under horizontal 
merger control. Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter 
referred as AML) was published in 2008 and took EU Competition law as an important 
reference. Comparing to the EU, the legislation and law enforcement of merger control 
in China is relatively limited. What can China learn from the EU and its abundant 
experience in Competition law? How to improve the skills of defining the relevant 
market? And further, how to improve transparency on both case decisions and judicial 
reviews in China? Through the comparisons with the EU, suggestions on further 
development of the relevant market definition in China will be proposed. 
 
1.2    Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter one is Introduction, targeting the 
research topic and introducing historical development of Chinese competition law. In 
Chapter two, approach of how European Union defines the relevant market is discussed. 
It is mainly focus on legal investigations, based on the provisions, the case law and the 
academic research results. Chapter three is about methodology applied in defining the 
relevant market, from an economic perspective. In this chapter, several economic 
methods for investigating the relevant market are introduced. SSNIP Test is 
emphatically introduced in this section, including how it functions and the way of 
evaluation. In order to apply SSNIP Test in practice more accurately, several auxiliary 
methods are applied simultaneously with the test. Chapter four in based on the 
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discussion above and comes up with the suggestions on the further development of 
defining the relevant market in China. There are three points I want to make in this 
chapter. The first one is ways to improve the techniques on defining the relevant market, 
such as taking more factors into consideration, coming up with reasons on the defining 
of the relevant geographic market, applying various analysis measures and so on. The 
second point is suggestions to improve the transparency of merger control, on both case 
decisions and on case investigations. The third point is methods to improve the 
effectiveness of review system, both on administrative reconsideration and judicial 
review. Chapter five is the Conclusion. The important issues of this research are lighted 
in this chapter as a summary.  
 
1.3    Methods of Research 
 
The main methodology applied in this thesis is comparative method. EU has applied 
competition law for decades and accumulated abundant of experiences, while Chinese 
anti-trust authority “Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China” (hereinafter 
referred as MOFCOM) is criticized for the lack of experience in applying the AML 
when it deals with merger activities.
1
 Thus, questions are raised that whether China 
can learn from advanced competition regimes, such as EU competition law. If the 
answer is positive, then how much and to what extent can China adopt from EU; what 
is more, how can China modify its particular legal techniques, with China its own 
political, economic and social situations?
2
 By making comparisons between EU and 
China in various aspects of competition law, we can tell both the similarities and 
differences Thus, a variety of solutions can be offered how China should take EU as a 
                                                      
1 X Wang, Comment on Operators Concentration in Anti-Monopoly Law of people’s Republic of China, 
(2008) Volume1 Law Journal, pp. 2-7; J Shi, Thinking about Complement of the System of Defense 
against the Substantial Test of Merger Control, (2009)Volume 12,The Law, pp.102-109.   
2 Y Huang, Pursuing the Second Best: the History, Momentum, and Remaining Issues of China’s 
Anti-monopoly law, (2008) Volume 75 Issue1 Antitrust law Journal, pp. 231-265. 
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reference from this comparative analysis.  
 
Historical analysis is also applied in this thesis. China has its own political, economic 
and social situation. China experienced a profound revolution from a 
central-government-planned economy to a socialist market economy, which brought 
great national economic vigor to China. However, there are still some traces of the old 
one left in China economy after more than thirty years’ reform. Especially, some 
historical issues, such as the position of State Owned Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) 
and administrative monopoly in particular industries, are still in fierce debate publicly. 
In order to value Chinese competition law, a historical perspective with China’s real 
situation is necessary.   
 
In Chapter three economic methodologies is applied to analysis and evaluate the 
various theories in order to define the relevant market. The definition of relevant 
market is derived from the fundamental market theory with Economics research 
results. These economic theories and calculation methods are used commonly in 
competition law, especially in practice.  
 
The thesis is based on library research. The study focuses on analyzing both primary 
and secondary sources. The primary sources contain China’s the AML, EU legislation 
and EU case judgments. The secondary sources in this thesis can be divided into four 
categories: academic textbooks, legal journals, comments or general reports of 
governments or organizations, and news from internet websites. Meanwhile, case-study 
approach is applied in this thesis. In the paper, published case decisions from 
MOFCOM are collected and organized. In Chapter two, some of the decisions are 
compared to EU cases, and in Chapter four more cases are referred to in order to come 
up with suggestions on Chinese the AML application.  
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1.4   Historical Development of the Chinese Competition Law 
 
1.4.1   Pre 2008 the establishment of the AML 
 
Chinese economic reform began from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in which the country decided to transit 
the economic structure from a central-government-planned economy to a socialist 
market economy in 1978.
3
 Before the transition, the government controlled all the 
resources and made all decisions relating to production and consumption and some 
significant historical tracks of such economy remained till now. In March 1986, the 
State Council established Regulations for Further Pushing the Development of 
Horizontal Alliance in Economy.
4
 In December 1987, Suggestions on Construction 
and Development of Business Conglomerate was established.
5
 The real breakthrough 
in this period was the establishing of The Interim Regulation on Merger
6
 in 1989, 
which showed a clear supportive attitude to encourage SOEs merger activities. During 
this period, at the aim of reducing the loss of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the 
government encouraged mergers between SOEs to increase their market power. 
 
In September 1999, Provision on the Merger and Division of Enterprises with Foreign 
                                                      
3 The announcement of the Third Plenary Session of The Eleventh Central Committee, People's Daily, 
Beijing, 24th December 1978. 
4 Regulations for Further Pushing the Development of Horizontal Alliance in 
Economy,[国务院关于进一步推动横向经济联合若干问题的规定], which was promulgated by the State Council 
of China on 23rd March 1986. It was repealed in 2000.   
5 Suggestions on Construction and Development of Business Conglomerate [国家体改委、国家经委关于组建和
发展企业集团的几点意见] was promulgated by the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System 
and State Economic Commission on 16th December1987. It has been ceased.   
6 The Interim Regulation on Merger [国家体改委、国家计委、财政部、国家国有资产管理局关于企业兼并的
暂行办法] was jointly promulgated by the former State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the 
State Development Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, the National State-Owned Assets Administration 
on 19th February 1989. It was repealed in 2000.   
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Investment
7
 was published, which was applied in the situation where a merger  or one 
of the mergers is a foreign investor. The authority in charge was the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (hereinafter referred as MOFTEC)
8. ‘The 
MOFTEC may, upon receipt of the documents as listed in the preceding paragraph, 
organize the relevant departments and agencies to hear the case of proposed corporate 
merger and conduct investigations into the company and the related market if the 
MOFTEC thinks that the corporate merger tends towards industry monopoly or it may 
constitute a predominant position in the market for particular commodities or services, 
which will hamper fair competition’.9This was a breakthrough in legislation however 
no further explanations on how to conduct investigations.  
 
After joining the WTO in 2001, China is getting faced with t challenges to improve 
level of trade liberalization while maintaining state economic security at the same time. 
MOFCOM and other five authorities jointly published Interim Provisions on Mergers 
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors in 2003.
10
 The purpose 
of this regulation including promoting and regulating foreign investors’ investment in 
China, maintaining fair competition and state economic security.
11
 This regulation was 
the first comprehensive and systematic legislation in merger control relating to foreign 
investment enterprises, building the framework of control merger investigation, setting 
                                                      
7 Provision on the Merger and Division of Enterprises with Foreign Investment [关于外商投资企业合并与分立
的规定] were promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce on the 23rd September 1999. This amendment was issued on the 
22nd November 2010. The analysis in this thesis is based on the amendment of 2010.   
8 Some functions of the MOFTEC were undertaken by the MOFCOM since it established in March 2003, the 
National Development and Reform Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission were under the 
control of the MOFCOM. The MOFCOM is one of administrative departments composing the State Council.   
9 Article 26, Ibid. 
10 The Interim Regulation on Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors was 
promulgated by the MOFCOM on 2nd January 2003 and took into effect on the12th April 2003.The amendment 
of 2006 was issued on 8th August 2006 and took effect on the 8th September 2006. It changed from ‘interim 
provision’ to ‘The Provisions for the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors’ on 22nd June 2009.   
11 Article 1, Ibid. 
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up measures, thresholds and enforcement of merger review, and coming up with 
procedure instructions.
12
  
 
As a conclusion, in this period before AML 2008, the legislation in merger control was 
very limited. Objects were limited to SOEs or foreign investment enterprises, and 
executive procedure was opaque with few factors being considered. Legal provisions 
were scattered in different regulations and the boundary of authorities was not 
illustrated legibly. In a word, during this time, a systematic legislation was highly 
expected to acclimatize the rapid development of economic. 
 
1.4.2  New period of Chinese Competition Law within the Framework of the AML 
 
The People’s Republic of China established the AML in August 15th 2008, which was 
the first comprehensive competition law of China, and this was a milestone in Chinese 
competition law history. Up to 13
th
 February 2014, the MOFCOM successively 
published fourteen Guidelines.
13
 These Guidelines along with the AML constituted 
                                                      
12 By August 2008, MOFCOM had received 590 proposed Mergers and acquisitions cases by foreign investors, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-08/04/content_8942596.htm. 
13 The fourteen guidelines are applied collaborated with AML, which are available at official website of the 
MOFCOM http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/, the list of the guidelines including:  
Regulations on the State Owned Enterprises Prohibiting the Competition (December 9th 1993);  
Regulation on Regional Restrictions in Social Market Economy by the State Council (April 18th 2001);  
Decisions on Regulation Social Market Order by the State Council (April 27th 2001);  
Interim Regulation on the Price Monopoly (July 8th 2003);  
Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings by the State Council (August 3rd 2003); 
Measure fro the Undertaking Concentration Declaration (November 21st 2009); 
Measure for the Undertaking Concentration Examination (November 24th 2009); 
Interim Provisions on the Divestiture of Assets or Business in the Concentration of Business (July 5th 2010); 
Interim Provisions on Assessing the Impact of Concentration of Business Operators on Competition (August 29th 
2011); 
Interim Measures for Investigating and Handling Failure to Legally Declare the Concentration of Business 
Operators (December 30th 2011); 
Interim Provisions on Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentration of Undertakings by the Ministry of 
Commerce (February 11th 2014); 
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the legal framework of Chinese competition Law, and play an important role of 
regulation market activities under competition environment. Until 9
th
 January 2015, 
MOFCOM published twenty-five case decisions.
14
 Even though case decisions have 
no legal force under Chinese legal system, the reasoning of the decisions given by 
MOFCOM is crucial when evaluation the enforcement of AML. 
 
Anti-monopoly Law is the fundamental legal regime in the market economy country. 
The AML is the core among many the Property Laws, which regulates the various 
social market relationships and establishes political, economic and social system. 
Judging from the main content of the AML, it is basically regulating monopolistic 
behaviors, thus, the AML is a Conduct Law. However, the AML is also talking about 
the enterprise scale, market structure and protecting consumer welfare, so it is also 
covering the property of Subject Law and Social Security Law. Since China’s reform 
and opening, the mainstream of Chinese economy has been a competitive market. So 
the requirement of anti-monopoly is coming from public desire of improving 
economic efficiency. 
 
Another historical meaning of the AML is that, by the establishment of this law more 
effective legal enforcement are declared. The AML gathered various legal documents 
which scattered in different levels and regions and combined those documents into a 
comprehensive Anti-monopoly law
15
. In the People's Republic of China, legislation is 
                                                                                                                                                           
Guiding Opinions of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce on the Declaration Documents and 
Materials of the Concentration of Business Operators (April 18th 2014); 
Guideline of the Declaration Documents of the Concentration of Business Operators (June 6th 2014); 
Interim Regulation on the Concentration Cleared with Restrictions (December 4th 2014). 
The English visions of those legal documents are available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/. 
14 Published case decision are available at the office website of the MOFCOM, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ 
15 ‘The various ministries, commissions, the People's Bank of China, the Auditing Agency, and a body directly 
under the State Council exercising regulatory function, may enact administrative rules within the scope of its 
authority in accordance with national law, administrative regulations, as well as decisions and orders of the State 
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divided into different levels: the first level is the Constitution of The People's 
Republic of China, the second level is National laws published by National People's 
Congress and its standing committee, the third level is Administrative Regulations 
published by the State Council and local government, the fourth level is 
Administrative Compulsory Measure by local government, and then the other legal 
documents. The lower level legislation cannot be against the upper level legislation, 
and if there are conflicts between different levels legislation, the upper level 
legislation will be applied. The AML is the National Law which is in relatively high 
level of Chinese legal system. That means the applications of the AML in practice 
would be a significant improvement on legal force than when the provisions were 
scattered in different legal levels. 
 
1.4.3  EU Competition Law as an Important Reference for the AML 
 
1.4.3.1  Same Objective of Protecting Customer welfare 
 
The EU and China have same objective on merger control, named protecting consumer 
welfare
16. ‘Effective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as low prices, high 
quality products, a wide selection of goods and services, and innovation. Through its 
control of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would be likely to deprive 
customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power of firms’.17 
Consumer welfare is considered as the standard of proof and the objectives of 
competition policy.
18
 Mario Monti, the former EU Commissioner, stated that ‘We both 
                                                                                                                                                           
Council’, Article 71 of The Legislation Law of The People’s Republic of China. The law was adopted at the third 
Session of the Ninth National People's Congress on March the 15th 2000 and was enacted on the 1st July 2000.  
16 Landes and Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases. Harvard Law Review (1981) pp.937. 
17 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, para.8 
18 A Pera and VAuricchio, Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and the Objectives of Competition Policy, 2005, 
Volume 1 Number 1, European Competition Journal, pp 153-177 
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agree that the ultimate purpose of our respective intervention in the market-place 
should be to ensure that consumer welfare is not harmed’.19 Consumer welfare is a 
consensus among the EU both theory and legal practice.  
 
Under the AML, ‘safeguarding the interests of consumer’ is illustrated as one of the 
objectives.
20
 In the decisions which had been published, the protection of consumer 
welfare was stated. In case Coca cola/ Huiyuan, the transaction was blocked
21
 and in 
case Mitsubishi Rayon/ Lucite, the notified transaction was cleared with restrictive
22
 
both because of having negative effects on consumer welfare. However, the objectives 
of merger control under the AML are multiple, not only welfare of consumers but also 
public interest and competitors’ interests. 23  
 
1.4.3.2   Similarities on Enforcing Authorizes 
 
The European Commission is an exclusive authority which has power to make 
decisions concerning concentrations with an EU dimension.
24
 The European 
Commission has comprehensive authority to engage in investigation, decision making 
and imposing sanctions to mergers with an EU dimension. In addition, it is 
responsible for issuing competition related guidelines to address the problem 
                                                      
19 Convergence in EU-US Anti-trust Policy Regarding Mergers and Acquisitions : an EU Perspective, UCLA Law First 
Annual Institution on US and EU Anti-trust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, speech by Mario Monti, 
European Commissioner for Competition Policy, in Los Angles, February 2nd 2004. Pp.2 Para. 6. 
20 Article 1, AML. 
21 Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22 Coca cola/ Huiyuan, Section IV Para.3, it will result in elimination and 
restraint of competition with existing fruit juice drinks enterprise and further damage the lawful interests and 
rights of the consumers. 
22 Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon/ Lucite, Section V Para.1, it will have negative impact 
on effective competition in China’s MMA market. 
23 Article 3, Interim Provisions on Assessment of impact of Concentration of Business Operators on Competition 
by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on September 5th 2011. 
24 Article 8, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of January 20th 2004 on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings (hereinafter referred as ‘EUMR’), [2004] O.J.L24. 
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identified by the Commission.
25
 The European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred 
as ECJ) and the General Court (hereinafter referred as GC) are only responsible for 
hearing appeals when the merger parties are object to the Commission’s decision and 
submit appeals.
26
 If the ECJ and the GC find the decisions of the Commission are not 
correct, they have no authority to make any antitrust merger decisions or impose 
sanctions directly.
27
 
 
In China, similar to EU, the MOFCOM is an exclusive administrative authority in 
charge of merger activities, which is responsible to legislation, reviewing mergers, 
accepting notifications and negotiation of concentrations, hearing witness, 
investigation, examining as well as making decisions and setting sanctions or 
restrictions if necessary.
28
 The relevant court is involved in the merger case when the 
parties concerned are object to the decision and submit appeals. However, unlike EU, 
                                                      
25 W.P.J. Wile, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in 
EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, (2004) 
Volume 27 No.2 pp.202-224.   
26 Article 230(2)of the EU Treaty, ‘It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, 
the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of powers’. Article 21(1) EUMR ‘subject to review by the [ECJ] the Commission shall have sole jurisdiction 
to take the decisions provided for in this regulation’.   
27 Appeals of merger case decision were discussed in M Furse, Competition law of the EC and UK, Sixth Edition, 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.189-201. 
28 The missions of f Anti-monopoly Bureau under MOFCOM is available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200809/20080905756026.html?1992812441=705144026, including: a. 
to draft the related regulation on merger control and formulate administrative rules and documents of 
administrative norms on interpretation of regulation; b. to examine mergers based on anti-monopoly law, accept 
notification, carry out the work of hearing, investigation and merger review; c. to accept and investigate 
concentrations which are notified to antitrust enforcement authority, and punish illegal activities; d. to investigate 
monopoly behavior in external trade, and take measures to eliminate its issues; e. to guide the responding of 
internal enterprises on anti-monopoly in foreign countries; f. to initiate and organize negotiation and discussion of 
competition articles in bilateral or multilateral agreements; g. to organize international communication and 
cooperation on bilateral or multilateral competitive policies; h. to be responsible for specific assignments by the 
Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council; i. to fulfill other assignments specified by the leaders in 
MOFCOM.  
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administrative reconsideration and judicial review are relatively weak in China. Thus, 
most actions of MOFCOM authority is kind of risky and in lack of supervision. 
 
1.4.3.3   Similar Objectives on Establishing an Integrated Market 
 
The EU is an economic and political organization with twenty-eight Member States, 
and every Member State is a relative independent market. “To build a single market” is 
important to the EU, thus it is also its principal economic rationale. The EU began with 
six Member States as an economic organization, and kept on its enlargement stably to 
establish a stronger union and extent its power on both economy and politics. The 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties.
29
 One of the main points of EU Competition law is 
establishing a single market among EU to enhance the mutual interactions in trade 
between Member States, and to achieve the free movements of goods, persons services 
and capital in this union. 
 
In China, monopoly is also a huge hindrance for the establishment of an integrated 
national market, both in the dimension of areas and industries. The economic 
development is unbalanced in China; some regions such as South-East coastal areas are 
highly developed while some regions such as North-West inland areas are apparently 
far behind. The local governments at different levels (province, city, county) may use 
the administrative power to protect local enterprises from social market competitions, 
by setting quantity restrictions, tax policy to non-local enterprises. Meanwhile, some 
industries are not open to enterprises for market competition, which hinder the market's 
vitality. Chinese national government is intending to break the barriers between 
different regions and establish a united national market and stimulate the vitality of 
                                                      
29 Article 26 (2) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred as TFEU).   
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market by more profound competition. From this sight, the objectives of establishing an 
integrated market are quite similar between EU and China. 
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Chapter 2   Defining the Relevant Market in the Light of EU  
 
 
2.1   introduction 
 
Defining the relevant market is the foundation of building up basic principles of 
competition law regime, and it is a crucial process of competition law practical 
application. In countries and regions where the framework of competition law has been 
established, defining the relevant market is the key step of competition assessment. In 
most cases, the competition assessments are based on effects of activities acted by 
enterprises, and the investigation results will lead decisions whether the activities of 
enterprises are legal or not. Thus, the scope where the competition happened must be 
referred and that is the scope we need to define as the relevant market. ‘Market 
definition provides a framework within which to assess the critical questions of 
whether a firm or firms imposes market power’30, then the competition authority can 
examine, to what extent, the enterprise will use its market power or its potential market 
power to make more profit, which will case negative effect on the competition, object 
to competition law regulations. From this light, it is fair to make a comment that 
defining the relevant market is the starting point and fundamentals of competition law 
practice and competition assessment.  
 
In competition assessment, the relevant market can be explained as ‘the smallest scope 
of products (or regions) which can form the monopoly’.31 Within the relevant market, 
the product can increase the price initiatively without significantly affected by the 
competition from products outside the scope of the relevant market. Products in the 
same relevant market are competitive with each other and constraints for each other in 
                                                      
30 Richard Whish & David Bailey, Competition Law (seventh edition), Oxford Press (2012) pp.28. 
31 Christian A. Melischek, The Relevant Market in International Economic Law: A Comparative Antitrust and GATT 
Analysis (2013) Cambridge University Press, pp.96. 
14 
 
certain period. Having substitute effect is the key factor for products to category as one 
same relevant market. Proper definition of the relevant market is the foundation to 
investigate the effect of merger activities on the market competition. Systematical 
qualitative and quantitative analysis on competition effects will be possible only within 
a proper scope of the relevant market, especially about the analysis of market share and 
market concentration ratio. Defining the relevant market is the issue of factual 
cognizance, but not the issue of coming up with regulations on legislation. Defining the 
relevant market as an intermediary of legal technique reflects the level of force in 
enforcement in competition law area. The definition of the relevant market significantly 
affects the results of competition assessments. If the relevant market is defined too wide, 
the enterprise under investigation which has already owned a large amount of market 
share and enjoyed significant market power will present to have a relative low amount 
of market share, thus its merger activities will be free of those merger control 
regulations. However, its real market power is relative high, so the enterprise can earn 
profit while harm the welfare of consumers by increasing the price or making a 
degradation on quality. On the contrary, if the relevant market is defined too narrow, the 
investigation will indicate a high amount of market share which is actually higher than 
its real market share. In that case, the enterprise will be ruled by merger control 
regulations and lead its merger activities illegal. Such error of restricting merger 
activities will hinder the development of economic efficiency, which is not the aim of 
application of competition law. 
 
2.2  The definition of the relevant market in EU 
 
Before 1997 the ECJ made several comments on definition of the relevant market in 
different cases and became a part of origins in the EU legal framework. In 1997, the EU 
Commission published the Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the 
Purposes of Community Competition Law (hereinafter referred as Notice), and made 
15 
 
clear explanations on the issue of defining the relevant market.
32
 This Notice is applied 
in the whole EU legal regime, including Article 85 and Article 86 of the former EEC 
Treaty (now Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU) and other regulations related to 
merger control.
33
 From the legal practice in recent years, various methodologies 
including economic analysis tools are used in the competition assessments and make 
the issue of defining the relevant market even more important.  
 
Definition of relevant product market and relevant geographic market:  
 
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of 
the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.
34
 
 
The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in 
which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which 
can be distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those area.
35
 
 
Market definition is not an end in itself, and it is ‘a tool for aiding the competitive 
assessment by identifying those substitute products or services which provide an 
effective constrain on the competitive of the products or services being offered in the 
                                                      
32 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 
[Official Journal C 372 of 9.12.1997]. 
33 Para. 7, Ibid. ‘The Regulations based on Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty, in particular in section 6 of Form A/B 
with respect to Regulation No 17, as well as in section 6 of Form CO with respect to Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
on the control of concentrations having a Community dimension have laid down the following definitions’. 
34 Para. 7, Ibid. 
35 Para. 8, Ibid. 
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market by the parties under investigation’36. Interchangeable or substitutable are the 
main points during the merger assessment. 
 
2.2.1 The relevant product market 
 
2.2.1.1  Demand side substitute  
 
Demand-side substitute means in the relevant market when the price of one product is 
increased, consumers will switch from this product to another product. Because of the 
consumers switching to other products or consuming from other suppliers, the 
enterprises which increase price will lose their sale volume and the behavior of 
increasing price will be non-profitable. ‘From an economic point of view, for the 
definition of the relevant market, demand side substitute constitutes the most 
immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a give product, in 
particular in relation to their pricing decisions’.37 
 
2.2.1.1.1  Physical characteristics and the intended use of the products 
 
‘An analysis of the product characteristics and its intended use allows the Commission, 
as a first step, to limit the field of investigation of possible substitutes. However, 
product characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show whether two products 
are demand substitutes. Functional interchangeability or similarity in characteristics 
may not, in themselves, provide sufficient criteria, because the responsiveness of 
customers to relative price changes may be determined by other considerations as 
well’.38 In general speaking, the products having similar physical characteristics or 
                                                      
36 S. Bishop and M. Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Applications and Measurement 
(third edition), Sweet & Maxwell (2010), pp.46. 
37 Para. 13, Ibid. 
38 Para. 36, Ibid. 
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intended use will have great possibilities to be categorized into a relevant market, 
however, there are exceptions.  
 
During decades of experience of EU Commission in competition assessments, in some 
special cases, the products having similar physical characteristics can be sorted as 
different relevant markets. In case Van den Bergh Foods, the Commission held that the 
market of impulse ice cream which brought as individual portions in shops for 
immediate consumptions and the market of take-home ice cream which bought as 
multi-packs of single items designed for storage and consumption at home were 
separated relevant product market. One main reason on this decision was the 
‘distinction on the basis of the consumer’s intended purpose in purchasing the ice 
cream in turn determines the differences in characteristics and price between impulse 
and take-home product’.39 It also stated that, ‘While, for many products, vertical 
restraints on the freedom of retailers can be accepted because they stimulate interbrand 
competition, such interbrand competition is less likely for impulse products, because 
customers do not in general enter a shop with the intention of buying those products and 
do not seek to compare the products of one sales outlet with those of another’.40 
Another example, case Michelin, the Commission considered the various factors 
including the specific characteristics and the uses by finally consumers, and then 
decided that the market for new replacement tyres for lorries and buses was separate to 
that for retreads.
41
 There are other case decisions expressing the same information, 
such as Microsoft
42
, Wanadoo
43
, Cleastream
44
 and so on.  
 
From above discussion, we can tell that the point in defining the relevant market is not 
                                                      
39 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, Para. 130. 
40 Para. 132, Ibid. 
41 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4071, Para. 116. 
42 COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft [2005] 4 CMLR 965, Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
43 COMP/38.233, [2005] 5 CMLR 120, Case C-202/07, France Telecom v. Commission [2009] ECR I-2369. 
44 COMP/38/096, [2005] 5 CMLR 1302, Case T-301/04, Clearstream Banking v. Commission [2009] ECR II-3155. 
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“ similar physical characteristics or the intended use”, but the substitutive effect 
between the products. Even though the products have similar physical characteristics or 
the intended use, the consumers have not found them to be substitutive, so the products 
will not be sorted into a relevant market. Even though in most cases, products have 
similar physical characteristics or intended use will constitute substitutive relationship, 
nevertheless if the this substitutive relationship is not reflected in the competition 
assessment, the products will not categorized as the same relevant market no matter 
how similar the physical characteristics and the intended use they are. On the contrary, 
if one product has some unique characteristics, it does not directly mean this product 
constitute a relevant market itself. If there are other products have substitutive effect to 
this product to a certain extent, they will be sorted as a relevant market in a certain case. 
A product can only become a relevant market itself when the unique part cannot be 
substituted by other products, thus it can increase the price without restrictions of other 
products in the market. So, relying on physical characteristics and intended use is not 
reliable all the time.  
     
2.2.1.1.2  The price different of the products  
 
The product price is an important index reflecting competition situations in the market. 
Normally, the level of products price and the qualities of products have negative 
correlation. The products for the same or similar intended use will be separatedinto 
different price levels so that the consumers are separated into different groups as well. 
However, the difference of price is not accurate in defining the relevant market. EU 
considers that the actual factor is not the absolute difference in price, but whether the 
change of one product price will affect the price of others with competition effects.  
 
In the same relevant market, two products must be substitutes and the price change of 
one product must influence the price of the other. Thus, investigating the changing 
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records of these products prices and analyzing their similarity or convergence of their 
price curves will provide evidences for the competition assessment. Based on that, we 
can infer the substitute relationship between the products.  
 
In some cases, products with different price level can be considered as separated 
relevant market. Even though products belong to a same category of product, the 
difference in price is too significant, thus separates different consumer groups, and 
makes products no significant substitute effects. Consumers who purchase products 
with higher price will not switch to lower price ones even though the price of their 
consumption goods increases. At the same time, if the price of the lower product 
increases, the consumers who purchase the lower price product will not switch to the 
higher price product when there is still significant price difference in between. This 
phenomenon appears obvious in various industries, such as clothes, cooking utensils, 
food and so on. For instance, the organic meat is sold in the market with price twice as 
much as regular meat, but consumers who prefer organic meat will not switch to other 
kind of meat as long as price of the organic meat increase in a reasonable range. 
 
2.2.1.1.3  Consumer preference of the products 
 
Consumer preference is also a factor which should be taken into consideration when 
defining the relevant market. Consumers will not switch to other products as delicate as 
they should be whenfacing the price increase if there is consumer preference existing. 
Consumer preference reflects the subjective factors of customers when they choose 
their purchase, not only restricted by pricing mechanism principle. Consumer 
preference can be generally divided into two types. ‘Products can be differentiated 
because of intrinsic quality differences (like e.g. fuel efficiency in cars, size of the hard 
drive in computers, after-sales services) or on grounds of perceived quality differences 
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(reputation of a brand in consumer goods)’.45  
 
When there is consumer preference, the consumers will not switch to same price level 
product or even lower price products. Consumer preference restricts the substitute 
effect between products, so this factor must take into considerate when necessary 
during the competition assessment process. The evidence of existing of consumer 
preference can be analyzed from the past record about how did the company make 
decisions, set price level, and conduct market activities based on the appearance of 
consumer preference. EU Commission will collect information from the third parities, 
such as industry union, other competitors in the same relevant market, consumers. In 
case Tetra Pak II, the consumer preference was considered as a factor when defining 
the relevant market. The reason stated by the Commission is that ‘this low elasticity of 
substitution can be explained by the marginal share accounted for by packaging in the 
retail price of liquid foods and by the fairly high stability of consumer preferences over 
a short period’.46 
 
2.2.1.1.4  The evidence of substitute in the recent past of the products 
 
The evidence of substitute from the recent past is one kind of evidence based on the 
substantial examples to indicate the substitutive relationship between products. If the 
loss of sale volume was because of the increase of price, to some extent, the evidences 
from the past can prove the substitutive effects between products and as an inference for 
the products belong to a same relevant market. These evidences can be very helpful for 
the competition assessment which is under scrutiny despite the situation happened in 
                                                      
45 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. Roundtable on Market Definition, 
Note by the Delegation of the European Union, May 31st 2012, DAF/COMP/WD (2012)28, Para. 23. The document 
is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2012_jun_market_definition_en.pdf 
46 92/163/EEC, Commission Decision, Tetra Pak II [1991], IV/31043, Para. 93; Case C-333/94 , Tetra Pak 
International SA v Commission [1996]. 
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the recent past. However, since the social economic market is changing rapidly 
nowadays, no one can guarantee the substitutive effects will show up again. Thus this 
kind of evidence is only an accessory reference in competition assessment, not a solidly 
reliable evidence all the time. Another point need to pay attention is that, the 
relationship of substitution is not balanced and symmetric all the time, which means 
one product have substitutive effect to another product does not mean the opposite path 
works as well. The other product may not constitute significant substitutive effects as 
return. In another word, consumers switching from product A to product B because of 
the price increasing of product A does not indicate that if the price of product B 
increases, consumers will switch back to product A. The market activities are 
extremely complex, influenced by various factors, and the social economic market will 
not be perfect balanced and symmetric. 
 
2.2.1.2 Supply-side substitute 
 
Besides the demand side substitute, the substitutive effect from supply side also 
influences the defining of relevant market. If the demand side substitute constructs the 
direct restrictions on competition, the supply side substitute is the potential restrictions 
on competition. Facing the pricing change of specific product, consumers can switch 
their purchase easily. Comparing to that, the switch of production from supply side is 
much more difficult, so the effect of supply side substitute is relative insignificant than 
demand side substitute. Under some circumstances, supply side substitute can, when 
the price of a certain product is increasing, adjust their productions in a short time 
period to earn a big sale volume because of the increase of price, so the activities of 
increasing will be unprofitable. ‘These situations typically arise when companies 
market a wide range of qualities or grades of one product’;47 The Commission had 
                                                      
47 Para.21, Notice. 
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accepted and applied the supply side substitute into practice in case decisions.
48
 
  
The factors which should be taken into considerations when investigating supply side 
substitute are similar with investigation of demand side substitute, including the 
evidence of substitute from the recent past, purchase routine and trade flows. Besides 
these factors, cost to switch production should be scrutinized, including the cost of 
adjusting production lines, building up distribution channels and obtaining purchase 
contracts.  
 
In addition to assessing the demand side substitutability, the Commission regularly 
analyses the supply-side substitutability when defining markets. However, generally 
the application of supply-side substitution is rather limited. According to the 
Commission, ‘Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when 
defining markets in those situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of 
demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy’49to significantly affect 
the outcome of the market definition practice, and this is also showed in the case 
decisions
50
.This means that competitive suppliers are able to switch production to the 
relevant products and market them in the short term without incurring significant 
additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices.
51
 
In case Torras/ Sarrio
52
, the Commission relied upon supply side substitution in 
considering a merger in the paper section
53
. The production of paper is a practical 
example of the approach to supply-side substitutability when defining the product 
markets. Paper products are categorized into a range of different qualities, from normal 
                                                      
48 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co Inc v. Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
49 Para.12, Notice. 
50 Case IV/M.458 Electrolux/AEG; Case T-65/96 Kish Glass and Co LTD v. Commission [2000] ECR II-1885; Case 
C-241/00p Kish Glass and Co Ltd v. Commission [2001] ECR I-7159. 
51 Para.20, Notice. 
52 Case IV/M.166, Torras/ Sarrio (1992). 
53 M. Furse, The Law of Merger Control in EC and the UK, Hart publishing [2007], pp.33. 
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writing and copying paper to very high quality papers, such as the papers for art books 
or the packing of luxurious products. These different qualities papers are not substitute 
for consumers, however, the production of paper can be adjusted with negligible costs 
within a relative short time period. In paper industry, paper manufacturers usually 
product based on the costumers’ orders, and they can have pretty much lead time to 
prepare for the order and adjust their production lines, so the production in this industry 
is very predictable. In this case, the Commission will take supply-side substitute into 
consideration and will not define different qualities papers as separate relevant markets. 
The various qualities of papers are categorized as a unified relevant market and the sale 
volume in different qualities paper are added up for a competition scrutiny. 
EXCELLENT WRITING 
 
2.2.2  The relevant geographic market 
 
The approach to geographic market definition is set in the Notice
54
 which faithfully 
following the definition illustrated by the ECJ in the Judgment of United Brands case: 
the relevant geographic market as comprising an area ‘in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous’.55 However, in practice, the definition of 
the relevant geographic market is not requiring exact homogeneous markets and the 
behaviors of undertakings may be constrained by imports from areas where the 
conditions of competition are not the same.
56
 The GC held that ‘the definition of the 
geographic market does not require the objective conditions of competition between 
traders to be perfectly homogenous. It is sufficient if they are “similar” or “sufficiently 
homogenous” and accordingly, only areas in which the objective conditions of 
competition are “heterogeneous” may not be considered to constitute a uniform market, 
                                                      
54 Para.8, Notice. 
55 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, Para. 11. 
56 V. Korah, An Introduction Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (ninth edition) 2007, Para. 4.3.1.2. 
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in the judgment of case Deutsche Bahn.
57
 
 
When defining the relevant geographic market, the most important factor considered by 
the Committee is the differences of competition circumstances between geographic 
areas related to the product market. The differences include regulations by local 
authorities, the limit of market capacity, local revenue level, public procedure, standard 
of environmental protection, criterion of technologies and so on. Those restrictions and 
rules have profound influences on companies’ market activities, and basically circle 
competition areas. Secondly, the cost of transportation and the physical characteristics 
should be considered abortively when defining the relevant geographic market. The 
products need to transport between different regions without significant increase of 
product price if the products are sorted as a same relevant geographic market. The 
transportation fee is crucial in the trade between different regions, and the cost is 
basically decided by the physical characteristics of the certain products. Some products 
have particular requirements on parking, such as glass, and some products need to be 
transported in certain temperature or time period, such as some food. Thirdly, the prices 
of products may be the evidence of constituting separate relevant geographic markets. 
Same kind of products with different price level in different region makes them belong 
to different relevant geographic market. Fourthly, the routine of purchasing and trade 
flows will influence the definition of the relevant geographic market. Fifthly, the 
consumer preference has significant effect on investigating the relevant geographic 
market, such as beer industry. This list is not exhausted, and there are some other 
factors may have obvious influences on the issue of relevant geographic market 
according to the certain circumstances of cases.  EXCELLENT WRITING  
 
2.3   EU Experiences on Defining the Relevant Market 
 
                                                      
57 Case T-229/94, Deutsche Bahn AG v. Commission [1997] ECR II-1689, Para.92. 
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2.3.1   Evidence from third parties and various factors 
 
From years of practice, EU realizes that it is crucial to collect evidence from a big range 
of market players to define the relevant market as long as the competition investigation. 
Every parties which may possibly relate to the area where the competition investigation 
is carried on, can provide their opinions and evidences to assist in defining the scope of 
relevant market. The market players include, related government departments, industry 
associations and organizations, main competitors, downstream distributors, main 
customers and main companies. Whenever it is appropriate and necessary, the EU 
Commission will address written requests for information to market players mentioned 
above. These requests contain market players’ opinions of the boundaries of the 
relevant market, their expected reaction to the hypothetical price increase, and other 
factual information which the Commission finds necessary or any information market 
players consider helpful to define the relevant market under the discussion. The 
Commission can also have discussions with companies’ director and officers to have a 
better understanding of the market situation between companies and between suppliers 
or customers. If the Commission finds it is necessary, they might visits or inspections to 
the production of those parties to have a better understanding of how products being 
manufactured and sold.
58
 This type of evidence is abundant in EU competition practice. 
When defining the relevant product market, product characteristic and intended use, 
substitution evidence in the recent past, views of customers and competitors, consumer 
preferences, barriers to potential substitutes and different categories of customers and 
price discrimination will be taken into consideration.
59
 When come to defining the 
relevant geographic market, evidence from the recent past, product characteristics, 
customers and competitors’ opinions, current geographic purchase pattern, trade flows, 
shipments pattern and barriers for companies in other areas, are considered.
60
  
                                                      
58 Para. 34, Guideline.. 
59 Para. 36 to 43, Guideline. 
60 Para. 44 to 50, Guideline. 
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2.3.2   High level of the transparency of evidence 
 
The EU Commission defines the relevant market on a case by case basis. The 
Commission makes an overall assessment of the case on the basis of all available 
evidence collected by the Commission, the local authorities, the parties and the other 
third parties. There is no hierarchy between different types of evidence or different 
sources of information.
61
 The types of evidence used and their importance depend on 
the characteristics of the industry and the products in question as well as the availability 
of the necessary quantitative and qualitative data, and the potential time constraints of 
the investigation. The Commission follows on open approach to any relevant 
qualitative and quantitative evidence aiming at making an effective use of all available 
information.
62
 The Committee will publish the evidence which is related to the 
definition of the relevant market, excepting the business confidential information. The 
Commission will obscure crucial business data which related to the confidential 
information and publish the fact without revealing parties’ business secrets if the 
information is important for defining the relevant market and necessary to be published. 
The Commission will notify parties involved in the cases and leave the information 
available to the public, so other parties are not requested by the Commission will also 
have a chance to become a part the case and provide the evidence form their own sight.    
 
2.3.3   An open approach of defining the relevant market 
 
Since the definition of the relevant market is such a complicated issue with so many 
                                                      
61 Case T-342/07 Ryanair Holdings v Commission [2010] ECR 3457, Para. 156 to 158, ‘There is no hierarchy 
between technical and non-technical evidence’. 
62 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. Roundtable on Market Definition, 
Note by the Delegation of the European Union, May 31st 2012, DAF/COMP/WD(2012)28, Para. 20. The document 
is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2012_jun_market_definition_en.pdf 
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factors should be taken into consideration, it is not rare that there will be multiple 
conceivable definitions of the relevant market.
63
 The reasons why there will be 
differences on relevant market definitions is various, the different backgrounds and 
particular situations of the case, different emphasis points of companies’ activities64 
and the different time period along with the changing market conditions
65
. In that case, 
the Commission practices to leave the market definition open. The premise to have an 
open definition of the relevant market is if under all alternatives the operation in 
question does not raise competition concerns. The precise definition will raise a lot of 
disagreements which are unnecessary, and will also leave heavier burden on both the 
parties and authorities during the competition investigation. An open definition of the 
relevant market is also illustrated in the provisions.
66
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
63 Para. 20, Notice. 
64 Case COMP/M. 3397 Owens-Illinois/ BSN Glass pack [2004] O.J.C 174/16, Para.24-26. 
65 Joint Case T-125& 127/97 Coco Cola v Commission, ECR[2002]Ⅱ-1773, [2000]5 C.M.L.R467 all ER(EC)460 Para. 
81-82. 
66 Para. 25. Notice. 
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Chapter 3    Methods Applied in Defining the Relevant Market 
 
 
The definition, as well as the evaluation of relevant market in the competition law, is 
derived from the fundamental market theory from Economics. In economics, most 
theories used for market properties research are emphasizing on their application in 
competition law practice. Thus, those theories and calculation methods derived by 
Economics are used most commonly, in evaluating the scope of a relevant market
67
, and 
in analyzing market power of each company. Normally, in order to do it accurately, we 
apply multiple economic methods to define the scope of a relevant market. 
 
3.1   Economics Theorems about the Relevant Market 
 
3.1.1   Residual Demand Curve 
 
Residual demand is the quantities of goods demanded by the market for a specific 
supplier. Mathematically, it is equal to the total market demand less supply provided by 
other companies other than the one which are researching on. In 1993, Kamarschen and 
Kohler
68
 first came up with the definition of residual demand curve. It is a visualization 
of residual quantity demanded (x-axis) by price (y-axis), putting other competitors’ 
reaction to market price change in consideration. Theoretically, given by the residual 
demand curve, for each quantity demanded, it automatically considers reaction of other 
products towards the price change of this specific product. In the real market, when 
companies are trying to merge with each other, their residual demand curves after each 
                                                      
67 Areeda and Turner clarify that, in economic terms a ‘market’ is one firm or any group of firms which, if unified 
by agreement or merger, would have market power in dealing with any group of buyers. From: ARREDA, P., and 
D.F. TURNER, 1978. Antitrust Law, Boston: Little Brown. 
68 From: KAMERSCHEN, D.R., and J. KOHLER, 1993. Residual Demand Analysis of the Ready to-Eat Breakfast 
Cereal Market, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 4 (winter), pp. 903-942. 
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merge are also approaching the market demand curve. Thus, residual demand curve is 
widely regarded as a tool to compare each company’s market power before and after the 
merge, especially in imperfect competition market. 
 
3.1.2   Price Relevance Theorem 
 
The core of Price relevance theorem is: if two goods are from the same relevant market, 
even though they may have different equilibrium prices in the short term, they will 
finally come to a same stable price in the long run; also, goofs produced in different 
regions will have a trend to getting closer in price. If the pricing relationship between 
two products is very significant, we will say that those two companies are having fierce 
competition; if the pricing relationship is not significant; such competition effect is not 
strong. The advantage of using Price Relevance Theorem is its compatibility with both 
simple and supplicated settings, and its relative small amount of data property (only 
consecutive prices of two goods are necessary). The limit of using Price Relevance 
Theorem is, in reality, the price change for our observational time period will mostly 
not converge because of its partial equilibrium assumption. 
 
3.1.3   Elasticity Theorem 
 
In economics, elasticity is defined as the sensitivity of response variable to the 
independent variable. Price elasticity of demand is the percentage change of quantity 
demanded versus the percentage change of the price. It means for each percentage 
change of price, how many percentage change will the quantities demanded be. Its 
formula is: 
EP= (△Q/Q′)/ (△P/P′) 
In which △Q is the quantities demanded changes after the price change. Q′ is the 
original quantity demanded before price change. △P is the difference of prices of good 
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before and after the price change. P is the original price.  
 
From the basic price elasticity of demand, economists have come up with other 
concepts such as cross-price elasticity of demand, price demand of residuals. Those 
concepts are playing very important roles in finding the border of relevant market. 
 
3.1.3.1   cross-price elasticity of demand 
 
Cross-price elasticity of demand is describing the magnitude of quantity demanded 
change after the price change of another good. Mathematically, it means for each 
percentage change of another good’s price, how many percentage change will the 
quantity demanded of this good will be. Its formula is: 
EP= (△Q/Q2)/ (△P/P2) 
In which △Q is the quantities demanded changes after the price change. Q2 is the 
original quantity demanded before price change. △P is the difference of prices of 
another good before and after the price change. P is the original price of another good. 
Cross-price elasticity of demand tells us the relationship between one product price 
with quantity demanded for another related good. There are two categories of such 
relationship: positive correlation (cross-price elasticity is positive), thus these two 
goods are substitutes; negative correlation (cross-price elasticity is negative), thus these 
two goods are compliments. 
 
In relevant market research, we want to test the strength of positive correlation 
(substitute relationship). If the absolute value of cross-price elasticity of demand is very 
large, it means raising price of one good will significantly increase the quantity 
demanded by another good, thus those two products are having strong competition 
relationship. Those two products could be categorized into a same market. On the 
contrary, if the absolute value is small or even negative, then we will say that those two 
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products are not belonging to a same relevant market, with weak substitute power. 
 
Cross-price elasticity of demand offers a very practical method to define the relevant 
market during legal enforcement. Because it is a quantitative research method, it could 
overcome the drawback of subjective pre-judgment in other qualitative methods. he 
United States Supreme Court first introduced cross-price elasticity of demand method 
in defining relevant market in 1952
69
, and started not using it in 197870. Anish 
Vaishnav’s research explains thoroughly reasons of not using it71. 
 
Also, Baker and Bresnahan’s research, they said they found ‘an econometric 
technique for estimating the single firm residual demand curve that does not require 
the estimation of demand cross-elasticity.’ And ‘The technique is particularly suited 
for the estimation of firm market power in product differentiated industries, where 
cross-elasticity are notoriously difficult to measure.’ And ‘this methodology is applied 
to estimate the market power of three firms in an industry characterized by product 
differentiation: brewing industry.’72 All of these add to the breakdown of using 
cross-price elasticity of demand. 
 
3.1.3.2   Residual Price Elasticity of Demand 
 
Residual Price Elasticity of Demand evaluates the magnitude of change of good 
                                                      
69 Case Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US 594 (1952). 
70 The Court decided not to rely on cross-elasticity of demand data, opting for a more subjective test. Case 
United Brands Co .v. Commission, (1978), ECR 207, (1978) 1 CMLR 429. 
71 In Anish Vaishnav research (2011) on pharmaceutical industry [4], she found ‘an overview of the structure of 
the pharmaceutical industry will provide a deeper understanding of the consequences and faults of using cross 
elasticity of demand to define product markets in the pharmaceutical industry.’ From: Anish Vaishnav, 2011. 
Product Market Definition in Pharmaceutical antitrust cases: Evaluating Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand. 
Columbia Business Law Review, pp.586. 
72 Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan, 1988. Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 6, pp. 283-300. 
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demanded by other companies in the same relevant market, when one company’s 
selling price changes. Different from normal demand curve, residual demand curve 
gives us the price (one company’s good price, y-axis) versus quantity demanded by 
other companies totally (x-axis). It would be more accurate to use residual demand 
curve to evaluate the market power of a specific company. Baker and Bresnahan 
believe that after one company changes its good price, other companies will definitely 
change their marking and producing strategies to adapt the change of market.
73
 To be 
exact, Residual Price Elasticity of Demand could tell us how fast and how much will 
other companies react to the price change of one specific company good. Lower 
Residual Price Elasticity of Demand means even though one company raise it selling 
price, most consumer will still buy it without switching to other substitutes; thus this 
company has a very strong market power. On the other hand, if the Residual Price 
Elasticity is very high, the rising price of one product will make consumer demand 
products from other competitors, which means weak market power for this specific 
company.  
 
3.2   SSNIP Test 
 
3.2.1   Fundamental theory 
 
SSNIP test is a common method used to define a relevant market, and is applicable in 
competition law cases worldwide. Simons and Williams argued that the introduction of 
the SSNIP test in the Guidelines significantly advanced merger analysis by introducing 
the concept of residual demand elasticity to bind the market.
74
 SSNIP is short for Small 
but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price. SSNIP is used to find the smallest 
relevant market. It first assumes a hypothetical monopolistic company will make a 
                                                      
73 pp. 292, Ibid. 
74 From: SIMONS, J.J., and M.A. WILLIAMS, 1993. The Renaissance of Market Definition, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 38, 
No. 4 (winter), pp. 799-857. 
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small but significant increment on long-run price. Then, it use hypothesis test to verify 
if this company could be profitable by this 5%-10% increase in price in long term, 
normally one year. SSNIP test is a reduplicative loop procedure. Products which might 
have substitution effect will be added and repeat the hypothesis test, until the increasing 
in price is profitable. Here are four steps:  
 
Step one, Define a small group of goods (or regions) as initial product candidate 
bundle; 
 
Step two, Assume one company with strongest market power or market share increase 
5% to 10% in price, and then we test its profitability. 
 
Step three, if increasing is not profitable, we need to bring the closest substitute into 
the bundle, then do step two repeatedly. 
 
Step four, when most consumers no longer choose to buy other goods after small but 
significant price change of these products, the loop stops. Then we will have the 
products bundle which define the scope of the relevant market.  
 
The procedure is shown as follow: 
34 
 
 
 
3.2.2   Evaluation of SSNIP Test 
 
SSNIP Test gives detailed standard on getting the substitute property between products, 
which is a milestone in defining the scope of the relevant market. It overcame the 
drawback of pre-judgment made for qualitative research, and set the framework of 
quantitative analysis on competition law area. 
 
In SSNIP Test, the crucial part is finding the closest substitutes, and putting them into 
an accurate order. Closest substitutes are a bundle of products which are ordered as its 
substitutive effects from strongest to weakest. They are products that could possibly be 
chosen if the initial product provided by monopoly is intimidatingly high. By adding a 
good from this bundle into the relevant market bundle, the price elasticity of demand 
will become minor and minor. After reaching a threshold, we will stop adding those 
good from substitute bundle into the relevant market bundle, and the reaming products 
in the relevant market bundle constitute the relevant market we are aiming to define. 
 
  
35 
 
Wrong order or bad selection of substitute goods will cause error. For instance, if we 
ignore some products which have strong substitutive effects. Then by adding those 
weak substitutes consecutively, we will also come to the threshold, but without those 
important strong substitutes. Thus, we will get a smaller relevant market definition. 
Another example is, if we put weak substitutes ahead of strong ones, we will first add 
those weak substitutes into the relevant market bundle which may not be necessary if 
we have an accurate order and put those strong substitutes into that bundle first. Thus, 
we will come to a larger relevant market definition, which is a typical violation of the 
principle of the smallest market. In order to avoid those errors, we will apply other 
method simultaneously, or try to apply several possible permutations of products rather 
than only one permutation.
75
  
 
3.2.3   Development of SSNIP Test 
 
With highly economic development and rapid change of market environment, it is 
becoming more and more difficult to apply SSNIP Test in practice, which needs amount 
of data to get the test result. In order to overcome its shortcoming, we apply other 
auxiliary testing methods with SSNIP Test, to make the border of the relevant market 
more accurate.
76
 
 
3.2.3.1   Price elasticity of residual demand 
 
In imperfect competitive market, we could also use Price elasticity of Residual Demand 
method along with SSNIP Test. This method has its advantage in analyzing market 
power of companies from differentiated markets, analyzing merging or conspiracy 
                                                      
75 PATRICK Massey. Market Definition and Market Power in Competition Analysis: Some Practical Issues. The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, October, 2000, p. 309-328 
76 Harris, R. and J.J. Simons, 1989. Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?, Journal of 
Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 12, pp.102 
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behavior of two companies. Its simple method and quick shot is the advantage. 
 
3.2.3.2   Critical Elasticity Analysis (CEA) 
 
First, assume that monopoly (duopoly) increase price little but significantly. By doing 
so, we will find the highest value of price elasticity of demand. If the price elasticity 
before price change is smaller than the value we got from CEA, then the price increase 
will not cause a big loss in consumers, then increasing price is profitable. However, if 
the price elasticity before price change is larger than the value we got from CEA, and 
then loss of customers cannot be made up by increase of good price. By using 
econometrics knowledge, CEA will diagnose market power of a company more 
accurately. 
 
3.2.3.3   Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) 
 
CLA are defined as the most loss of sales a company could suffer after increasing price. 
It evaluates the loss of market caused by increase of price, assuming a company is very 
powerful in the market. It tells us the equilibrium loss of market that it can suffer by 
applying “increasing price” strategy. It is the threshold that makes a company 
non-profit after raising its product price. 
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Chapter 4   Suggestions on the Further Development of Defining the 
Relevant Market in China 
 
 
4.1  Developing Comprehensive Analysis on Defining the Relevant    
Market 
 
In 2009, a Guideline on the Definition of the Relevant Market was published by the 
Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council, one year after the enforcement of the 
AML 2008.
77
 This Guideline took the EU Commission notice on the definition of 
Relevant Market as an important reference, and also followed similar framework as the 
EU regulations on defining the relevant market. The analysis in the Guideline was 
pretty in depth; however the enforcement of defining the relevant market on merger 
cases in practice was far behind the provisions on the Guideline. In this section, 
suggestions to China merger control practice will be given based on the analysis of 
published case decision from the MOFCOM. Chinese legislature will learn a lot from 
foreign jurisdictions especially from the experience of the EU. On May 6
th
 2004 the 
Ministry of Commerce of China and the Directorate General for Competition of 
European Commission reached an agreement on a structured dialogue on competition 
of which the terms of reference.
78
 It established a permanent mechanism for 
consultation and transparency between China and the EU in the competition field. 
Carried out through the EU-China Trade Project, this agreement will definitely 
enhances the EU's role of technical and capacity building assistance to China.  
                                                      
77 Guideline of the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council for the Definition of the Relevant Market was 
promulgated on the 24th May 2009 and took effect on the same day. The official Chinese vision is available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/j/200907/20090706384131.shtml and the unofficial English translation vision is 
available at http://www.cuplge.com/info_show.asp?news_id=30705. Hereinafter referred as Guideline.  
78 Terms of Reference of the EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue, on May 6th 2004. Key documents and 
speeches in establishing the bilateral relations are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/china_tor_en.pdf.  
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4.1.1   Taking more Factors into Consideration in practice when defining the relevant 
product market 
 
As provisions in the Guideline, the relevant market refers to ‘a market comprised of a 
group or a category of commodities that are considered by consumers to have a 
relatively strong substitution relationship based on the characteristics, uses and prices 
of the commodities. These commodities have a relatively intense competitive 
relationship, and it may be considered as the commodity scope within which business 
operators compete with each other in the anti-monopoly law enforcement’.79 The 
factors in consideration were listed in the provisions, including the evidence in the 
recent past, physical characteristics and intended use, price different, distribution 
channel, consumer preference and other important factors. However the factors to be 
considered shall include but not limited to the scope of those mentioned above. 
80
 
 
It is a step by step progress to develop the definition of the relevant product market. In 
the first published case Inbev/ Anheuser-Bush
81
 , the definition of the relevant product 
market was even not mentioned. It is in the case Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite
82
 that the 
definition of relevant market was firstly established in the published merger control 
decisions.  
 
      ‘The main overlapping part in manufacturing and distribution between 
Mitsubishi and Lucite China is MAA. Besides that, the companies have a relative 
small scope of overlap in producing SpMAs, PMMA particles and PMMA sheet. 
In this concentration, the effects in competition are limited in other three 
                                                      
79 Article 3, Guideline. 
80 Article 8, Guideline. 
81 Announcement MOFCOM [2008] No.95 Inbev/ Anheuser-Bush. 
82 Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite. 
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products except MAA.’83 
 
Defining the relevant market as overlapping product market by MOFCOM appeared in 
the case Pfizer/ Wyeth.
84
 In the following cases, the effect of substitution was examined. 
In case Uralkali/ Silvinit, the MOFCOM defined potassium chloride as a relevant 
product market, given its unique product feature and usage which cannot be substituted 
by other potassic fertilizers or vice versa
85
. In case Savio/ Penelope, the MOFCOM 
defined the market of electronic yarn clearers for automatic winders as a separate 
market, since the authority found its functions could not be substituted by other devices 
during the competition investigation.
86
 However, the factors that considered in the 
assessments were absent, as well as further reasoning on definition of the relevant 
market. 
87
 
 
In case GE/ Shenhua, the licensing market of coal-water slurry gasification technology 
constituted the relevant product market since coal-water slurry gasification technology 
differs significantly from that of others, which based on requirements for raw coal, 
feeding method and so on.
88
 In case Seagate/Samsung, HDD constituted a separate 
product market as: It differs from solid-state hard drives, flash drive and other 
                                                      
83 Section IV, Ibid. 
84 In Para. 1 Section IV, relevant products markets in this transaction are defined as human drugs and animal 
health products. Products of merging parties overlap in the domestic market of China in: (1) human drugs, 
including JIC and N6A (2) animal health products, including Mycoplasma Pneumonia of Swine (MPS), Swine 
Pseudorabies Vaccine (SPV) and Combination Vaccine for Dogs (CVD). Announcement of MOFCOM [2009] No.77, 
Pfizer/Wyeth. 
85 Para.2 Section II, Potassium chloride is primarily used as potassic fertilizer. Potassic fertilizers include at least 
potassium chloride, potassium sulphate, potassium nitrate, potassium dihydrogen phosphate and potassium 
magnesium of sulphate. Potassium chloride is generally used as raw material for other forms of potassic fertilizer 
and compound fertilizer. Announcement of MOFCOM [2011] No.33 Uralkali/Silvinit. 
86 Para. 3 Section II, It has the unique function of expeditiously treating yarn defects in an extremely short time; 
other devices are unable to do so. Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio/Penelope. 
87 Li Yuanshan, A Critical Evaluation of the Analysis of Horizontal Mergers under the Anti-Monopoly Law in China. 
(2013) University of Glasgow, pp.56. 
88 Para. 3 Section IV. Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.74 GE/Shenhua. 
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secondary storage devices in terms of volume, price, purpose etc. HDDs are 
customarily further categorized by reference to their end use including enterprise 
HDDs, desktop HDDs, mobile HDDs and consumer electronics HDDs.
89
 However, the 
assessment did not analyzed the substitutive relationship of these four sub-industries. In 
case Henkel HK/ Tian De products involved in this concentration were ethyl 
cyanoacetate, cyanoacrylate monomer and cyanoacrylate adhesives. With the 
consideration of the product physical characteristics, manufacturing process, intended 
use and other factors, MOFCOM decided that ethyl cyanoacetate, cyano acrylate 
monomer and cyanoacrylate ester adhesives do not have significant substitutive effects 
to others and constituted separate relevant product markets.
90
 In case UTC /Goodrich, 
the listed factors which was taken into concerned included physical characteristic of the 
product, intended use, manufacturing condition and the tender practice of downstream 
customers, but the analysis on each factors were missing from the assessment.
91
 
 
For the practice of Chinese merger control, reflecting from the published cases from the 
MOFCOM, the ability of defining the relevant market is relative low at the present 
stage. In the most published cases, the scope of the relevant product market is limited to 
the overlapping products, and the definition of the relevant market is defined even 
before the competition investigation. The intuitive factors which concerns the 
definition of the relevant product market are quite limited, such as physical 
characteristics, intended use, and manufacturing process, while some other important 
factors are rarely mentioned such as consumer preference, brand loyalty, public 
procurement and so on. From the EU experience, the scope of the relevant product 
market is far more than the overlapping products. Moreover, considering only product 
characteristics and intended use of the product is insufficient to examine whether 
products under concern are substitutive. In summary, more substantial factors should be 
                                                      
89 Para. 2 Section II. Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
90 Para. 2 Section II. Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.06 Hankel HK/Tiande. 
91 Para. 2 Section II. Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.35 UTC /Goodrich. 
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taken into concern and the further explanations on each factor are required.   
 
4.1.2  Providing reasoning on Defining the Relevant Geographic Market  
 
The definition of relevant geographic market illustrated in the Guideline is: ‘a scope of 
geographic areas within which consumers can acquire commodities that have a 
relatively strong substitution relationship. Such areas have a relatively intense 
competitive relationship with each other, and it may be considered as the geographic 
scope within which business operators compete with each other in the anti-monopoly 
law enforcement’. 92  The factors considered from the perspective of demand 
substitution including the evidence of the rent past, transport costs, product features, 
distribution channels, trade barriers and other important factors such as tariff, local 
regulations, environmental protection and technology.
93
 According to the provision list 
of the factors is not limited to those mentioned above. However, in practice, the 
definition of the relevant geographic market is just final definition without further 
reasoning or explanation. 
 
In the first two published cases Inbev/ Anheuser- Bush
94
 and case Coco Cola/ 
Huiyuan
95
, no specific definitions of the relevant geographic market. From the 
published assessments, we could infer that the definition of the relevant geographic 
market was China market. However, this definition was criticized by the scholar, 
especially in the case Inbev/ Anheuser-Bush, they believe the relevant geographic 
market was narrow than the whole China market. As the claimed ‘Beer is sold to 
consumers in regional geographic markets through a special distribution system in 
                                                      
92 Article 3, Guideline. 
93 Article 9, Guideline. 
94 Section III, in order to reduce the anti-competitive effects on China’s beer market. Announcement MOFCOM 
[2008] No.95 Inbev/ Anheuser-Bush. 
95 Para.3 Section IV, constituting negative competitive effect on China’s Juice industry further development. 
Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.29 Coco Cola/ Huiyuan. 
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which the breweries sell beer to distributors, which, in turn, sell to retailers. The 
distributors' contracts with brewers contain territorial limits and prohibit the 
distributors from selling beer outside their respective territories. Because the 
distributors cannot sell a brewer’s products outside their territories without violating 
their contracts with the brewer, brewers can charge different prices in different regions 
for the same package and brand of beer, and individual distributors (and retailers) 
cannot defeat such price differences through arbitrage. In other words, due to such 
contractual arrangements, the relevant geographic beer market should be defined as 
regional’.96 
 
The specific definitions were came up in the following case, either China market or 
global market, but the explanations were absent from the assessments.
97
 Case Novartis/ 
Alco
98
 was a big step forward, since the market share in China and global were set out 
separately. The MOFCOM was focus on the investigation on China market. In case 
Uralkali/ Silvini and case Savio/ Penelope the assessments stated the concentrations 
might have substantial effect in either China market or global market.  
 
The first explanations on the definition of the relevant geographic market appeared in 
Case GE/ Shenhua, ‘Since the operational scope of the expected joint venture merger is 
in China, and domestic buyers of coal water slurry gasification technology only 
consider its suppliers inside China, the relevant geographic market for this 
concentration is the China market’.99 In the case Seagate/ Samsung, global market was 
defined as the relevant geographic market with the reasoning that the procurement and 
                                                      
96 X Zhang and V Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, (2010) Volume 6 Issue 2, E.C.L.R., pp. 
482-486. 
97 Case Mitsubishi Rayon/ Lucite MOFCOM [2009] No.28; Case Motors/ Delphi MOFCOM [2009] No.76 ; Case 
Pfizer/ Wyeth MOFCOM [2009] No.77, the relevant geographic market was defined as China market. In Case 
Panasonic/ Sanyo MOFCOM [2009] No.82, the relevant geographic market was global market. 
98 Para.2 Section IV, Novartis/ Alco MOFCOM [2010] No.53.  
99 Para. 3 Section II, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.74 GE/ Shenhua. 
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supply of HDDs were in a world-wide basis.
100
 The historical evidence of the 
international trading was raised as the reason in case Henkel HK/ Tiande to define the 
relevant geographic market as global market.
101
 In case, Marubeni/Gavilon, the 
MOFCOM outlined factors relied on to delineate geographic market, namely trade 
flows, consumption habits, transport and imports. However the market situation of each 
factor was not clarified.
102
  
 
In a word, in the assessments of the MOFCOM, the definition of the relevant 
geographic market is mentioned. And in many cases, several factors may affect the 
definition of the relevant geographic market were illustrated. But, there were no 
detailed explanations or analysis on each factor for further reference. In this stage of the 
MOFCOM performance on defining the relevant geographic market, it is either China 
market or global market, not specific enough based on the certain cases. For example, 
within the scope of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, there are free of tariffs, 
so that for the concentrations happened in this area, the relevant geographic market 
might be wider than China market. 
 
4.1.3  Considering Supply-side Substitution when Necessary 
 
The demand-side substitution has the priority during the investigation of concentration 
in China. The MOFCOM is mainly considering the demand-side substitution, which is 
similar to the practice of EU, and only take supply-side substitution when necessary. 
According to the Guideline, ‘the method for defining the relevant market is not the only 
one. In the practice of anti-monopoly law enforcement, different methods may be used 
for different circumstances. When defining the relevant market, demand substitution 
analysis can be conducted based on the characteristics, uses and price of commodities, 
                                                      
100 Para. 2 Section II -(a), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/ Samsung. 
101 Para. 2 Section II, Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.06 Hankel HK/Tiande. 
102 Para. 2 Section II-(b), Announcement MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/ Gavilon. 
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and supply substitution analysis can be conducted when necessary’.103 ‘To define the 
relevant market from the perspective of supply, usually the following factors shall be 
considered: the evidence on other business operators’ response to changes in the price 
or any other competitive factor of commodities; the production flow and technique of 
other business operators, the difficulties for them to change the line of production, the 
time needed for changing the line of production, the extra costs and risks in changing 
the line of production, the market competitiveness and marketing channels of the 
commodities provided after the line of production is changed, etc'.
104
 However, there 
are no clear standards of what constitutes the supply substitution analysis is ‘necessary’, 
which makes the application of supply-side substitution in practice very obscure and 
not able to be operational.  
 
Up to now, among all the published cases, not a single concentration investigation has 
taken supply-side substitution as a consideration when defining the relevant market, 
which will lead to a narrower scope of the relevant market than reality. The 
controversial case Coco Cola/ Huiyuan was a typical example which should consider 
supply-side substitution during the process of defining the relevant market. In juice 
industry the production from the supply side can be very flexible. It is not difficult for 
the supplier to change the juice content to manufacture different kind of juice products 
in order to adjust to the different requirements of consumers. Besides, switching 
production to the relevant products will not incurring significant additional cost and can 
be made in a very short time. If the supply-side substitution was taken into 
consideration in this case, the scope relevant product market would be wider, as a return, 
the decision on this case might be different.  
 
4.1.4   Applying Various Analytical Measures on Market Definition 
                                                      
103 Article 7, Guideline. 
104 Article 8, Guideline. 
45 
 
 
Defining the relevant market is a highly professional technique required issue, which 
combines the knowledge of law, economy, statistics and the specific background 
knowledge related to the certain industry which under consideration. According to the 
provision of the Guideline, ‘the method for defining the relevant market is not the only 
one. In the practice of anti-monopoly law enforcement, different methods may be used 
for different circumstances. When defining the relevant market, demand substitution 
analysis can be conducted based on the characteristics, uses and price of commodities, 
and supply substitution analysis can be conducted when necessary’.105 In the Guideline, 
the SSNIP test is also referred,
106
.However, since the establishment of the Guideline; 
the SSNIP test has never been applied in the case decisions by the MOFCOM. The main 
reason might be that the Chinese government is not ready to deal with the limitations of 
the SSNIP test which is also mentioned on the Guideline.
107
 The other reason for the 
limited use of the SSNIP test is because the level of transparency of information is 
relatively low in China, it is hard to get sufficient data to conduct of the test. Whereas, 
the SSNIP test is widely applied in competition assessment in the global perspective 
providing useful evidence for merger investigations. Thus, the skill of applying the 
SSNIP test must be improved in China. Besides that, various analytical measures 
aiming to define the relevant market should be applied in practice to improve the level 
of enforcement of the AML. 
                                                      
105 Article 7, Guideline.  
106 Article 10, Guideline. ‘Usually, the relevant product market is firstly defined with the hypothetical monopolist 
test. Starting with the product (initial product) supplied by the business operator subject to the anti-monopoly 
examination, it hypothesizes that the business operator is a monopolist aiming at profit maximization 
(hypothetical monopolist), and then the issue to be analyzed shall be, under the precondition that the sales 
conditions of other products remain unchanged, whether the hypothetical monopolist is able to continuously 
(normally one year) increase the price of the target commodity to a small extent (normally 5% to 10%). Rise in 
price of the target commodity will result in demanders’ switching to other products which have a strong 
substitution relationship with the initial product and consequently lead to the decrease of the sales volume of the 
hypothetical monopolist. If, after the price of the initial product increases, the hypothetical monopolist still has a 
stand to profit even the sales volume drops, the initial product constitutes the relevant product market’. 
107 Article 11. Guideline. 
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4.2  Increasing the Transparency on both Progress and Case Decisions 
 
Transparency is an important issue in government process, which means the ability of 
the public to see and understand the workings of the merger review process of market 
definition. It requires fair and responsive explanation of the anti-trust enforcers' action 
and inaction.
108
 As discussed above, in the competition law enforcement, the anti-trust 
authority enjoys a large range of discretion, thus the transparency of authority process 
on merger control is becoming even more crucial. Transparency of merger analysis 
enhances knowledge and compliance with the law and limits political interference and 
arbitrary activity in competition matters.
109
 In China, the case decisions have no legal 
force under Chinese legal framework; however the requirement for transparency of 
merger control is concordantly accepted. Transparency of the reasoning process from 
anti-trust authority will improve the predictability of the merger control result and make 
the decisions more convincing by the public. The EU Commission expects to increase 
the transparency of its policy and decision-making in the area of competition 
policy
110
and also illustrate in the case decisions.
111
 
 
4.2.1  Improving Transparency on Case Decisions 
 
Compared to the EU Commission, the level of transparency in China on the case 
decisions is relatively low. Among all published case of MOFCOM, eleven transactions 
were also reviewed by the EU Committee. All these eleven cases were approved with 
restrictive conditions. At the same time, from the EU dimension, four cases were 
                                                      
108 R Pitofsky, Comments on Warren Grimes: Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, (2003) Volume 51, 
Buffalo Law Review, pp.995. 
109 C S Rusu, A Few Considerations regarding Transparency and Legal Certainty in European Merger Control, 
(2007) Issue 2, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Jurisprudentia, pp.180-196. 
110 Article 4, Notice. 
111 Para.100, Case T-199/99 Sgaravatti Mediterranea Srl v Commission [2002] E.C.R. II-2289. 
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approved with outright clearance, and seven cases got clearance with commitments.
112
  
 
4.2.1.1   Transparency on Decisions without commitment 
 
The MOFCOM is not required to publish its reasoning of the decisions when the 
mergers are cleared without commitment. According to the provision of ALM, ‘where 
the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to prohibit a 
concentration or attaches restrictive conditions on concentration, it shall publicize such 
decisions to the general public in a timely manner’, which means if the merger activity 
is approved without commitment, there would be no obligation to publish reason of the 
decision. The MOFCOM will publish a list of merger cases without commitment every 
season, but only with the name of the merger parties and the date of the transaction 
getting approved.
113
 The same situation in the EU is that more information is required 
to be published and much higher level of transparency. In the EU, the Commission 
needs to publish a brief statement on the decision of outright clearance. The statement 
contains identifications of the parties, nature of the transactions as well as definition of 
the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. This statement does 
not need to include information in detail, especially the reasons for the decision. 
However, the basic information related to the mergering activity will be mentioned, 
such as the effects on the structure of the certain industry, the affected market, and the 
factors considered in the substitution test and the extent of the overlapping part of the 
merger parties.
114
  
 
                                                      
112 Comparisons of merger assessments in the EU and China on the same cases are presented in the Appendix. 
113 On 6th January 2013 the MOFCOM published its merger cases without commitment during the last quarter of 
2012 for the first time. Since then, outright cases are published on the MOFCOM’s official website at the end of 
every season. Before 2013 there was no information regarding transactions which were cleared outright by the 
MOFCOM. 
114 Case COMP/M.5778 Novartis/Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8. 
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Some scholars may think that publishing statements on every transitions even including 
the cases with outright clearance can be imprudent and tremendously burdensome, and 
would result in hundreds of cursory opinions that provide little guidance to the 
public’.115 However, considering the very first stage of the practice of China AML, the 
consistency and predictability of the decisions is crucial for the further development of 
the AML. Publishing basic information of the case decision which approved without 
commitment will be extremely helpful to improving the system. And it will also interest 
the public to scrutinize the enforcement of the authority.  
 
4.2.1.2  Transparency on Decisions with restrictions or prohibited Decisions 
 
In China, case decision with restrictions or being prohibited requires a published 
statement from the MOFCOM with reasoning of such outcome. However, the 
reasoning published by the MOFCOM is neither comprehensive nor profound when 
compared to those in the EU. For the EU side, the Commission will publish a detailed 
document of reasoning in merger cases which are blocked or cleared with commitments. 
In the EU competition assessment, the part related to defining of the relevant market 
always comes with an in-depth analysis, and takes large portion of papers to evaluate 
the various factors in the transaction. Also, the very obvious difference of the 
transparency on the case decisions can be revealed by the number of pages of published 
assessments. Normally, the length of the decision of prohibition or cleared with 
commitment from the EU Commission will be around fifty pages, while MOFCOM in 
China will come up with an assessment entirely only three to four pages.
116
 As 
                                                      
115 C S Rusu, A Few Considerations Regarding Transparency and Legal Certainty in European Merger Control, 
(2007), SUBB Jurisprudential, pp. 185. 
116 In case decisions of Pfizer/ Wyeth, Novartis/ Alcon and Panasonic/ Sanyo, the Commission used 96, 58 and 45 
pages respectively to illustrate the process of competitive assessment. See Case COMP/M.5476 Pfizer/ Wyeth 
[2009] O.J. C 262/1; Case COMP/M.5421 Panasonic/ Sanyo [2009] O.J. C322/13; Case COMP/M.5778 Novartis/ 
Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8. Clarifying competitive assessment of these three transactions in China only took 3 and 4 
pages respectively. 
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mentioned above, lots of information and factors are neglected by the MOFCOM, such 
as the evidence collected from the merger parties and the third parties. Other missing 
information could be: procedure of the substitution test, comprehensive introduction of 
the product, analysis of the background of the parties, structure of the related industry 
and so on. In general, the decisions published by the MOFCOM are not focus on 
reasoning but concluding, which is very different form the EU Commission. A 
complete and in-depth analysis in the competition assessment is very important for the 
issue of transparency in the Anti-trust law area. The reasoning comes from the 
assessment can be a useful reference for the further merger parties. A higher level of 
transparency will promote the consistency and predictability in applying regulations in 
merger control, and also serves as a safeguard of the misuse of the discretion by the 
government authority. In a word, establishing detailed competition assessment related 
to the definition of relevant market ‘promotes discussion and understanding of the 
working procedure of competition authorities’.117   
 
4.2.2  The Drawbacks on Account of Lack of Transparency 
 
Corruption is a serious issue in China and is always criticized by the public. Even 
though this situation is becoming much relieved after adopting a series of important 
measures by new government headed by President Xi, Jinping, there are still amount of 
corruption existing in China nowadays in various areas. For the issue of anti-monopoly 
examining, due to the large scope of discretion authorized to the MOFCOM and the low 
level of transparency of the case decisions, the possibility of corruption is obviously 
large. At the same time, the scandal of bribery and lobbying can be aroused if the public 
is not able to scrutinize the enforcement authority’s assessment on the noticed 
transactions. Another reason which raised public concern is that the MOFCOM is under 
                                                      
117 K R Fisher, Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?, (2006) Volume 11 No.327, 
Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, pp.127. 
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the control of the highest level of state administration. It may potentially lead to the 
result that ‘the MOFCOM’s decisions may introduce non-competitive considerations, 
which results in economically adverse effects so that an anticompetitive transaction’s 
being allowed, or a healthy, profitable transaction’s being blocked’.118  
 
The case SEB/ Supor was very controversial because the transactions got clearance 
without commitment from the decision of the MOFCOM. Because the case was 
approved without commitments, the MOFCOM were not required to publish the 
reasoning of its decision. The assessment result could be very different if the definition 
of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market changed. 
Background of this concentration is: Lyon-based Group SEB (EPA: SK), the world’s 
largest manufacturer of countertop kitchen appliances, has reportedly agreed to raise its 
stake in Zhejiang Supor Co. (SZ: 002032), a Hangzhou-based manufacturer of 
cookware and small electric house ware, from 51.31% to 71.31% to US$526 million. 
After a Chinese anti-monopoly investigation, Group SEB was permitted to increase its 
30% stake in Supor to a majority stake in November 2007.
119
 According to the claim of 
the merger parties, the relevant product market was the whole cooker market, since the 
pressure cookers was one kind of the cooker and should be belong to the whole cooker 
market as a part. The market share of Supor was not exceeding 10% and the sale 
volume in China was only 700 million CNY out of the whole sale volume of Chinese 
cooker market which was about eight to ten billion CNY. By this relevant market 
definition, this concentration would not substantially affect competition in Chinese 
cooker marker. However, if the relevant product market was defined as pressure cooker, 
the situation would be totally different; the effect of the transaction would be significant 
                                                      
118 Q Bu, Coca Cola/ Huiyuan – market-economy Drive or Protectionism? International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, (2010) Volume 41, No.22, pp.202-210. 
119 The MOFCOM’s decision of outright approval did not clarify any dissent of the public. 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_csg_ChinaMADigest_02221
1.pdf.        
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and substantial. Supor’s market share on the pressure cooker increased every year, and 
became the biggest producer in this area. The data of market share of Supor is showed 
below:
120
 
 
 
Thus the main issue of this case and the effect of the concentration was based on the 
definition of the relevant market: whether it is the pressure cooker or all kinds of 
cookers in the market. If the sales in the rural area is included, the market share should 
over 70 percent. From my perspective, the physical characteristics and the intended use 
as well as the price levels could be distinguished easily in China market. Thus, such a 
case decision contained a lot of opacity and raised certain suspect of corruption of the 
anti-monopoly authority. 
121
  
 
In order to prevent such controversial situation, the transparency of the case decisions 
must be improved. First of all, the transactions cleared without commitment should 
come up with at least a brief statement which is accessible to the public, including the 
nature of the transaction, the background of the merger parties concerned and the 
                                                      
120 Data from China Industrial Information Issuing Centre.  
121 Li Yuanshan, A Critical Evaluation of the Analysis of Horizontal Mergers under the Anti-Monopoly Law in China. 
(2013) University of Glasgow, pp. 76. 
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business activities, the defined relevant product and geographic market. For the cases 
cleared with restriction or being blocked, a much deeper analysis should be published 
to let the public understand the reasoning behind the decision. Some crucial 
information must be included, such as the structure of the relevant market, different 
opinions from the third parties, and competition assessment result of the substitute test. 
Nowadays, the MOFCOM’s published decisions concerning the cases cleared with 
restrictions or being blocked are just at the same level of detail as the decisions for cases 
clearance without commitment published by the EU. So there is long way for China to 
improve the transparency on case decisions.  
 
4.3  Improving the Effectiveness of Judicial Review Mechanism 
 
The approaches to correct misjudging of the concentration merger are divided into two 
hierarchies. ‘where any party concerned objects to the decision made by the 
anti-monopoly authority in accordance with Article 28 and Article 29 of this Law, it 
may first apply for an administrative reconsideration; if it objects to the reconsideration 
decision, it may lodge an administrate lawsuit in accordance with law’. 122  The 
effectiveness of administrative reconsiderations and administrate lawsuit have crucial 
meanings for the application of the competition law, and that will be an obligatory step 
for the further development of China’s AML. 
 
4.3.1  Administrative Reconsideration 
 
There is almost eight years since the application of the AML, however, not a single 
administrative reconsideration has been raised according to the decision of 
concentration. This astonishing fact has already shown the ineffectiveness of 
                                                      
122 Article 53, AML. Article 28 and Article 29 AML is about concentration being prohibited or approved with 
restrictions. 
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administrative reconsideration. This progress is only written on paper, but not used in 
practice to correct the faults of the concentration decisions. It is understandable that 
there is no regulation or procedure is perfect, so will be the concentration investigation. 
That is why the ex-post measures are important, which can fix the flaw of the original 
regulation. The ineffectiveness of administrative reconsideration and the absence of the 
application could be summarized in three reasons illustrated below.  
 
First of all, the authority which carries on the reconsideration on the concentration case 
belongs to the MOFCOM too. In the MOFCOM, the Administrative Monopoly Bureau 
is to accept and review the applied concentration and the Department of Treaty and Law 
in the MOFCOM undertakes the administrative reconsideration of merger control. 
They are under the same control: MOFCOM. No wonder that they would like to 
maintain the consistency of the MOFCOM’s decisions. What is more, the mentioned 
authorities are all in the system of the State Council, which has the mission of 
protecting the security of social economy and maintain market completion in order, so 
they seem not willing to overturn the decisions contradicting to this mission.
123
  
 
Secondly, there is no specific detailed guidance on the procedure of administrative 
reconsideration on concentration; the request of reconsideration should be apply 
according to Administrative Reconsideration Law generally. However the problem is 
that the reconsideration on concentration requires lots of professional skills in the 
relevant areas and abound evidence/ information to be investigated. The Administrative 
Reconsideration Law only illustrates the general process, but not the specific criteria 
which can be applied in the assessment as reference. The substantial part of the 
                                                      
123 Article 85, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 2004. ‘the State Council, that is, the Central People’s 
Government, of the People’s Republic of China is the executive body of the highest organ of state power; it is the 
highest organ of State administration’. And Article 89, ‘the State Council exercises the following functions and 
powers: (3) to formulate the tasks and responsibilities of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, to 
exercise unified leadership over the work of the ministries and commissions and to direct all other administrative 
work of a national character that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ministries and commissions’. 
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application of administrative reconsideration is missing, so its effect is much less 
convincing.  
 
Thirdly, the enforcement of the reconsideration is not guaranteed in practice. The result 
of the reconsideration is not the final decision even if the reconsideration reflects there 
is an error in the former merger assessment. Within the administrative system in China, 
the superior governments have authority to change the decision of administrative 
reconsideration by signing official documents. In addition, during the investigation 
process, the staff who performs investigation does not have the authority to make 
decision. All decisions should be made by the head of the Department of Treaty and 
Law, who is not involved in the investigation directly and have limited information on 
the background of the case. 
 
Considering all the reasons mentioned above, the effectiveness of the administrative 
reconsideration on concentration must be improved. Because of the high demand of 
professional skills on the concentration investigation, a guideline which applied 
specifically on merger decisions should be filed. Meanwhile, more authority should be 
granted to the staff that is actually carrying out the investigation in order to make 
decisions based on direct evidence. Moreover, the authorities should its governmental 
perspective, and re-examine the case from a sight of social economic market.   
 
4.3.2  Administrative Lawsuit 
 
Provision for administrative lawsuit of concentration decisions is set out in the 
Administrative Procedure Law. At present, the most serious problem of China’ judicial 
review is the courts’ legal authority is not independent of executive power.  
 
The interpretation from the Supreme Court of China states that the court should respect 
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the demarcation of executive power and judicial review according to the Constitution. 
Thus, courts are reluctant to initiate a further analysis if the case is related to the issue 
such as the public interests, the discretion of the executive department, policies 
orientated by local governments and other local restrictions published by local 
administrative authorities. More straightforwardly, the implementation of the judicial 
review by the Courts is kidnapped by the government. A lot of scholars criticize this 
situation and point out that when it comes to the administrative lawsuit, the courts 
become government organs just happening to fulfill the judicial functions.
124
 Thus, the 
judicial review must be independent from the governments if the effectiveness of 
administrative lawsuit on concentration wants to be improved. The provision in the 
Constitution law must be implemented into practice and leave a free and independent 
space for judicial review.
125
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
124 M U Killion, Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review, (2004), Volume 26 No.3, Houston Journal of 
International Law, pp. 507-559. 
125 Article 126, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2004, ‘the people’s courts exercise judicial power 
independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and not subject to interference by any administrative 
organ, public organization or individual’. 
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Chapter 5   Conclusion  
 
 
China established the AML in 2008 and opened a new epoch for China’s competition 
law. Before the AML, China’s merger control was rather limited to the scope of SOEs 
or enterprises with foreign investment. There was no comprehensive merger control 
system in China and the objectives were opaque including those not aiming at 
anti-monopoly. A systematic legislation in antitrust area, such as the AML, was highly 
expected. The AML was a milestone of China’s competition legislation and being the 
very first comprehensive competition law of China. The AML collected various 
regulations scattered in different levels and regions and gather them into a convergent 
legislation with higher level of force. The AML built the framework of China’s social 
market competition order, and provided legal bases for the business activities in social 
market economy.  
 
EU competition law is one of the most important references for the establishment of 
the AML. There are many similarities between EU and China of the core points in 
competition regulation and practice. Firstly, both EU and China take protecting 
customer welfare as the very crucial objective. Secondly, the enforcing authorizes are 
similar in EU and China from their functions, executive power and statues in merger 
control. Thirdly, the objective on establishing an integrated market is similar. EU 
works on building up a single market without internal frontiers among member states, 
while China looks forward to break the barriers of different regions and establishes an 
integrated national market. EU has abundant experience in merger control for decades 
of practice, thus China can learn a lot of EU, especially at this beginning stage of 
China’s AML. 
 
A proper definition of the relevant market is the first step as well as the key step of 
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merger assessment. The relevant market contains the relevant product market and the 
relevant geographic market. The MOFCOM showed a fast learning ability during the 
almost eight years establishment of the AML, however the way of defining relevant 
market by the MOFCOM is not further developed in this period, and the experience of 
EU Commission is a helpful reference for the China government to learn from. When 
defining the relevant market, EU takes demand side substitute as an essential aspect, 
considering various factors including physical characteristics, intended use, different 
pricing, consumer preference, as well as opinions from third parties, consumer 
feedback and evidence from the recent past. From the MOFCOM’s published cases, 
not so many factors are taken into consideration. In some cases, the relevant product 
market was defined as the overlapping product market and the substitute analysis was 
not provided deeply enough. The physical characteristics and the intended use are 
considered as crucial factors; however from the EU case law it is not sufficient for a 
proper definition of relevant product market. 
 
The Commission investigates the supply side substitute when constituting enough 
restrictions on competition, which is also raised in case decisions. Even though supply 
side substitute is illustrated in the China’s provisions, it is not applied in practical 
cases. The Commission has a developed comprehension on when and how to 
investigate in supply side from its case decisions which needs to be learned 
elaborately by the MOFCOM. 
 
When defining the relevant geographic market, the Commission will come up with 
detailed analysis considering competition circumstances, transportation cost, price 
difference, trade flows, consumer preference and so on. In China, the MOFCOM will 
only listed relevant geographic market either China market or global market without 
further explanation.  
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Alongside the development of EU competition assessment various qualitative and 
quantitative analysis methods are applied in the competition investigations. And 
multiple economic methods are used as tool to define the scope of a relevant market, 
including residual Demand Curve Theorem, Price Relevance Theorem, Elasticity 
Theorem and especially the SSNIP Test. This method is applied in competition 
assessment worldwide and become an important recourse for the definition of the 
relevant market. In the published document of the MOFCOM, the SSNIP Test is also 
mentioned, but not applied in practical case either.  
 
Compared with the experience of EU in defining the relevant market, some 
suggestions are proposed for the further development of the MOFCOM.  
 
First of all, the techniques of defining the relevant market should be improved and 
comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the definition of the relevant market should 
be illustrated in the case decision. The MOFCOM should take more factors into 
considerations during the assessment, like involving consumer opinions and their 
preference. The reasons for the definition of the relevant geographic market are 
required, since the market competition circumstances are quite complicated, a simple 
decision of either China market or global market is not enough. Supply side 
substitution is also a crucial factor in certain case and industry. By Learning from 
developed competition regime, the MOFCOM could try to apply various analytical 
measures on market definition in practical cases and improved the level of using those 
methods step by step. 
 
Secondly, increase the transparency on competition investigation and case decision. 
The level of information release is relative low of the MOFCOM comparing to the EU. 
A lot of crucial information is not noticed to the public during the investigation and 
some parties which may have relationship with the case cannot be involved into the 
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investigation. The transparency of the case decision is also expected to reach a higher 
level. The cases approved without restriction should come up with a brief case 
decision but not only a list of parities name and approving date. The cases approved 
with restrictions or being blocked should be present with more detailed assessments 
with profound reasoning to convince the public about its decision. Lack of 
transparency is harmful to the development of China’s social market competition, 
leaving the space for the lobbying.  
 
Thirdly, the government should work on the effectiveness of judicial review. The 
approach to correct misjudging of the concentration merger is divided into two 
hierarchies, namely administrative reconsideration and administrative lawsuit. 
Unfortunately, neither these two approach are effective. Administrative 
reconsideration is charged by the department which also in the control of the 
MOFCOM. The administrative lawsuit is always criticized for its ineffectiveness 
since the courts’ legal authority is not independent of executive power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Appendix 1   the Statistics of Mergers Notified from the 
MOFCOM
126
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
126 Statistics between 2008 and 2012 is from the article M Furse: Merger Control in China: Four and a Half Years 
of Practice and Enforcement-A Critical Analysis, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Volume 36, Issue 
2 (2013). 
Year Notifications Filing 
accepted 
Completed  
reviews 
Withdrawn Unconditional 
clearance 
Conditional 
clearance 
blocked 
2008   17  16 1 0 
2009   80   4 1 
2010   117   1 0 
2011 203 185 168 5 159 4 0 
2012 201 186 154 6 142 6 0 
2013-1     45 0 0 
2013-2     56 2 0 
2013-3     54 2 0 
2013-4     56 0 0 
2014-1     45 1 0 
2014-2     68 2 1 
2014-3     48 1 0 
2014-4     75 0 0 
2015-1     62 1 0 
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Appendix 2   Horizontal Merger Control in both China and EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal merger 
parties 
Decision of the 
MOFCOM 
Date of the 
MOFCOM 
Decision 
Decision of the 
Committee 
Date of the 
Committee 
Notification  
Pfizer/ Wyeth Conditional 
clearance 
29.09.2009 Clearance with 
commitments 
29.05.2009 
Panasonic/ Sanyo Conditional 
clearance 
30.10.2009 Clearance with 
commitments 
11.08.2009 
Novartis/ Alcon Conditional 
clearance 
13.08.2010 Clearance with 
commitments 
18.01.2010 
West Digital/ Viviti 
Technologies 
Conditional 
clearance 
02.02.2012 Clearance with 
commitments 
23.11.2011 
UTC/ Goodrich Conditional 
clearance 
15.05.2012 Clearance with 
commitments 
26.07.2012 
Glencore 
International/ 
Xstrata 
Conditional 
clearance 
16.04.2013 Clearance with 
commitments 
22.11.2012 
Marubeni/ Gavilon Conditional 
clearance 
23.04.2013 Outright 
clearance 
24.08.2012 
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